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Constitutional Apostasy: The Ambiguities in 
Islamic Law After the Arab Spring  
Brian O’Connell 
¶1  In October 2009, Iranian Baptist Pastor Youcef Nadarkhan was arrested for 
apostasy because he converted from Islam to Christianity.1 In November 2010, he was 
sentenced to death. In December 2010, the Pastor’s case was referred to the Supreme 
Court in Qom, Iran.2 On June 12, 2011, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of 
“turning his back on Islam, the greatest religion the prophesy of Mohammad at the age of 
19,” although the Supreme Court remanded to further investigate whether he committed 
the crime as an adult as opposed to converting as a child.3 The Court bluntly stated “[I]f it 
can be proved that he was a practicing Muslim as an adult and has not repented, the 
execution will be carried out.”4  
¶2  Although the Iranian penal code does not recognize apostasy, the Iranian 
Parliament reportedly approved the death penalty for apostasy in 2008, and the U.S. State 
Department reports that apostasy is now punishable by death.5 On September 30, 2011, 
Iranian state Farsnews reported that Nadarkhan remains in prison for “security-related 
crimes” and “rape” but has not yet been executed.6 The same press release also referred 
to Youcef as a “Zionist.”7 Despite the recent news asserting that he had been punished for 
                                                 
1
 Human Rights Watch, Evangelical Christians Targets of Religious Persecution, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 
29, 2011, 5:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/human-rights-watch/evangelical-christians-
ta_b_987967.html. 
2
 Jay Sekulow & Jordan Sekulow, Setting the Record Straight—Pastor Youcef’s Life Still Hangs in the 
Balance, AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, (Nov 4, 2011, 2:47 PM), http://aclj.org/iran/setting-
record-straight-pastor-youcef-life-still-hangs-balance. 
3
 Unofficial Translation of Pastor Youcef Nadarkhan’s Verdict (September 25, 2011), 
http://c0391070.cdn2.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/pdf/youcef-nadarkhani-iranian-supreme-court-verdict-
english-translation.pdf (the brief was obtained by CNN from the American Center for Law and Justice and 
was translated from its original Farsi by the Confederation of Iranian Students in Washington) (hereinafter 
“Unofficial Translation”). 
4
 Id.  
5
 Michelle A. Vu, Iran Parliament Approves Death Penalty for Apostasy Bill, CHRISTIAN POST (Sept. 11, 
2008 11:02 AM), http://www.christianpost.com/news/iran-parliament-approves-death-penalty-for-
apostasy-bill-34230/; 2010 International Religious Freedom Report: Iran, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 3 
(September 13, 2011), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168264.htm. 
6
 State Media Reports Iranian Pastor Facing Execution for Rape, Not Religion, FOX NEWS (Oct 1, 2011), 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/10/01/state-media-reports-iranian-pastor-facing-execution-for-rape-




 FARSNEWS, supra note 6.  
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a different crime, translations of the original conviction only mentioned apostasy.8 In 
December 2011, the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran reported the 
execution had been delayed.9 However, CNN reported on February 23, 2012 that a local 
court had issued a final verdict ordering the Pastor’s execution.10 His legal team tried to 
appeal, but according to the report, he could have been executed at any time and without 
notice to his counsel.11 
¶3  On September 8, 2012, Pastor Youcef was released, having his charges lowered 
from apostasy to “evangelizing Muslims.” The “evangelizing Muslims” charge had a 
three-year sentence, and Youcef was given credit for time served.12 However, on 
Christmas Day, Pastor Youcef was reportedly re-arrested to complete the remaining 45 
days on his three-year sentence.13 Youcef has since been released again, but was 
reportedly ordered to return to prison again to document his final release.14 
¶4  This case has gained a political following from both religious groups and civil 
liberties groups in the United States. Republican Congressman Joe Pitts and the first 
Muslim Congressman, Keith Ellison, co-sponsored a resolution condemning Pastor 
Youcef’s imprisonment and demanding that he be immediately exonerated and released.15 
President Obama, the State Department, and former Republican Presidential candidate 
Mitt Romney all condemned the imprisonment.16  
¶5  The problem of criminalizing apostasy in Iran is not limited to this single incident. 
The United States Department of State reported in 2012 that since President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad took office in 2005, the Iranian media have intensified attacks on religious 
minorities and police raids against such groups have escalated. In addition to Pastor 
                                                 
8
 Dan Merica, Iranian Pastor Faces Death for Rape, Not Apostasy—Report, CNN (September 30, 2011), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/09/30/world/meast/iran-christian-pastor (explaining that the 2010 Supreme 
Court decision where the pastor was sent to death was only on an apostasy charge). 
9
 Roxana Saberi, Iran Must Stop Persecuting Minority Religions, CNN (December 21, 2011), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/12/21/opinion/saberi-iran-religion/index.html?hpt=op_t1. 
10
 Dan Merica, White House, State Department Condemn Iran on Pastor’s Execution Orders, CNN 





 Meredith Bennett-Smith, Pastor Youcef Nadarkhani Freed: Iranian Pastor Sentenced To Death For 




 Kristin Wright, Youcef Nadarkhani, Iranian Pastor, Reportedly Detained on Christmas Day, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 26, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kristin-wright/iranian-pastor-youcef-
nad_b_2363155.html. 
14
 Paul Marshall, Iran’s Religious Crackdown, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, (Jan. 25, 2013), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/338864/iran-s-religious-crackdown-paul-marshall#. 
15
 Caitlin Burgess, House Passes Ellison Resolution Condemning Iran’s Treatment of Pastor Youcef, 
RICHFIELD PATCH (Mar. 5, 2012), http://richfield.patch.com/groups/politics-and-elections/p/house-passes-
ellison-resolution-condemning-iran-s-tre6d96ea1584. 
16
 The White House, Press Release, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY (Feb. 23, 2012), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/23/statement-press-secretary-case-iranian-pastor-
youcef-nadarkhani; Mark Toner, Execution Order for Iranian Christian Pastor Youcef Nadarkhani, OFFICE 
OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184566.htm; Mitt 
Romney: Pastor Youcef Nadarkhani Death Sentence an Outrage Against Humanity, ROMNEY FOR 
PRESIDENT (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.mittromney.com/news/press/2011/10/mitt-romney-pastor-youcef-
nadarkhani-death-sentence-outrage-against-humanity. 
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Youcef, the State Department reported that in June 2010, Behrouz Sadegh-Khandjani 
received a death sentence “for apostasy following his arrest on an unknown date.”17 
Missionary work, or proselytizing Muslims to convert to non-Muslim religions, is 
illegal.18 Criminalization has increased in recent years. Between June 2008 and June 
2010, Iran arrested 115 individuals for apostasy or evangelism. In the following six-
month period, July through December 2010, Iran arrested 161 individuals for the same 
crimes.19 The State Department reported that in 2011, 33 of those individuals remained in 
prison.20 Recently, another Pastor who converted from Islam to Christianity was 
imprisoned, and reportedly remains imprisoned on charges of evangelizing Muslims.21 
¶6  The problem of apostasy crime is not unique to Iran, but given Iran’s hostile 
relationship with the West, this story has drawn much attention. Countries that recognize 
Sharia law often recognize apostasy as a crime.22 Courts using Sharia law have enforced 
un-codified apostasy laws in order to protect public policy.23 However, those countries 
that have better records on human rights tend to have superior constitutional protections 
for religious minorities.24  
¶7  Apostasy punishment is a serious problem in environments where there is an 
absence of the rule of law.25 In countries experiencing ethnic and religious tension, the 
threat of punishment for apostasy outside the scope of law remains a problem. As the 
case studies that follow will show, those countries with better records on religious 
freedom tend to have stronger language within their constitutions protecting religious 
freedom and international norms.  
¶8   Part I of this paper will explain Sharia law and the law on apostasy in Islamic and 
Muslim-majority countries. Part II will describe the international law on freedom of 
religion with specific emphasis on the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948 (hereinafter “UDHR”) and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights of 1966 (hereinafter “ICCPR”). Part III discusses how this tension 
between Sharia law on apostasy and the international norms promoting religious freedom 
is resolved in several Islamic and Muslim-majority countries. This section explains how 
constitutional ambiguity on international norms and public safety exceptions to human 
rights can be exploited by radicalized regimes at the expense of those who choose to 
                                                 
17
 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 5, at 14.  
18
 Id. at 3.  
19
 Id. at 15.  
20
 Id.  
21
 Jordan Sekulow, Pastor Saeed’s Trial: Bail Rejected—Will Iran Uphold Its Obligations to Protect 
Religious Liberty?, ACLJ (January 21, 2013), http://aclj.org/iran/pastor-saeed-trial-iran-uphold-obligations-
protect-religious-liberty.  
22
 Nicholas Garces, Islam, Till Death Do You Part? Rethinking Apostasy Laws Under Islamic Law And 
International Legal Obligations, 16 SW. J. INT’L L. 229, 234 (2010). 
23
 Maurits S. Berger, Apostasy and Public Policy in Contemporary Egypt: An Evaluation of Recent Cases 
from Egypt’s Highest Courts, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 720, 738 (2003). 
24
 TAD STAHNKE & ROBERT C. BLITT, THE RELIGION-STATE RELATIONSHIP AND THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM 
OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: A COMPARATIVE TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 
PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM COUNTRIES 10 (2005); see also Middle East and North Africa, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/regions/middle-east-and-north-africa. 
25
 Timothy G. Burroughs, Turning Away From Islam In Iraq, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 517, 548 (2009) (“Over 
the past twenty-five years, Islamic vigilantes have murdered far more apostates and imputed apostates than 
Islamic regimes have executed.”).  
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leave Islam. Part IV recommends that new and developing democracies in the Middle 
East codify a respect for international law and give unqualified grants of religious 
freedom within their constitutions to avoid any ambiguity that more radicalized future 
regimes could exploit. By protecting freedom of religion in accordance with international 
law, the constitution would protect those who change religions from punishment for 
apostasy and evangelization.  
I.   THE CRIME OF APOSTASY 
¶9  This paper will examine the crime and punishment of apostasy in the Islamic 
world. Apostasy, (“riddah” in Arabic) is the reverting or turning away from the Islamic 
faith.26 The word applies only to former Muslims, whereas non-Muslims are just said to 
“change religion.”27 In the case of Egyptian courts, whether the former Muslim converts 
to Christianity, becomes an atheist, or converts to any other religion is irrelevant.28 The 
Pastor Youcef example has gained some attention from the religious right29 in America 
because of the persecution against Christians, but apostasy is neutral as to what religion 
the former Muslim becomes after leaving Islam.30  
¶10  Under Sharia law, a person born a Muslim has no choice over his or her religion 
because it is a crime to leave Islam once one becomes a Muslim.31 As a result, there is a 
contradiction in the laws of many Muslim countries that enforce Sharia law. Their 
constitutions say they allow for freedom of religion, yet the state forbids Muslims from 
choosing their religions.32  
¶11  There are twenty-two countries that give Islam an official role in their 
constitution.33 Although each country provides at least nominal protection for religious 
minorities in their constitution, in practice, the freedom of religion for individuals is 
limited. Such limitations generally include restricting the protection to a selected class of 
religious minorities, having public safety exceptions to the constitutional right, and 
allowing for normal legislation to trump the constitutional protections.34 Despite these 
constitutional protections for religious minorities, countries that recognize Sharia law 
generally consider apostasy to be a crime.35  
                                                 
26
 DR. ABM MAHBUBUL, ISLAM, FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN SHARI’AH: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 179 
(2002). 
27
 Berger, supra note 23, at 721-22.  
28
 Id.  
29
 Katherine Weber, Iranian Pastor Youcef Death Sentence: Conflicts Emerge Between US and Iran Media, 
CHRISTIAN POST (November 14, 2011, 12:47 PM), http://aclj.org/iran/christian-post-iranian-pastor-youcef-
death-sentence-conflicts-emerge-between-us-iran-media. 
30
 Johanna Pink, A Post-Qur’anic Religion Between Apostasy And Public Order: Egyptian Muftis And 
Courts On The Legal Status Of The Baha’i Faith, 10 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 409, 418 (2009) (“Baha’is are 
also considered apostates. Unlike, Christianity, they are not a recognized faith. Therefore, they are either 
apostates or Muslims under Sharia law. If their parents are Baha’is, they have until the age of 15 in Egypt 
to embrace Islam or they are labeled apostates under the law.”).  
31




 STAHNKE & BLITT, supra note 24, at 10.  
34
 Id. at 15.  
35
 Nicholas Garces, Islam, Till Death Do You Part? Rethinking Apostasy Laws Under Islamic Law And 
International Legal Obligations, 16 SW. J. INT’L L. 229, 234 (2010); MOHAMED S. EL-AWA, PUNISHMENT 
IN ISLAMIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 61-62 (1982); MAHBUBUL, supra note 26, at 207.  
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¶12  Although there is no explicit requirement in the Quran ordering the death penalty 
for apostasy, those countries that use the death penalty for apostasy rely on classic 
Muslim jurists. While the Quran is silent on the death penalty for apostasy, these scholars 
cite the Hadith, records of the practice of the prophet Mohammed, in which he reportedly 
said “[w]hoever changed his Islamic religion, then kill him.”36 The Quran itself does not 
explicitly mention a punishment for apostasy but it does condemn it and threatens a 
“mighty chastisement.”37 However, the Prophet also reportedly never actually executed 
anyone for leaving the Islamic faith.38 Furthermore, most religious sources only mention 
the afterlife as a punishment for conversion from Islam.39  
¶13  Proponents of harsh punishments link the strength of Muslim society to the faith of 
its people, and believe that those who leave the Islamic faith are threatening their 
security.40 In a way, the concern is similar to concerns about treason against the state in 
secular countries.41 The Quran also says that those who embrace Islam are obligated to 
preserve Islam.42 Moreover, the strength of Islamic society is tied to the strength of its 
faith; apostates threaten Islamic society.43 Usually, the accused apostate is invited back 
into the faith before punishment is dealt out, and the accused is only punished if the 
person refuses to repent.44 This is the current situation in Iran.  
II.   THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
¶14  International human rights law unequivocally supports the freedom to change 
religion. The UDHR states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and 
freedom, either alone or in community.”45 Despite some of the Islamic nations’ 
objections to a provision that allowed for people to change their beliefs, the Declaration 
was unanimously adopted by the 58-member General Assembly.46 Under the UDHR, 
apostasy is a protected right, not a crime. 
¶15  That norm of freedom of religion is continued in the ICCPR, which was entered 
into force in 1976. The ICCPR, unlike the UDHR, is binding in that it is a ratified 
treaty.47 Iran is also a ratified member of the ICCPR. As a member, Iran has accepted 
                                                 
36
 EL-AWA, supra note 35, at 237. El-Awa questions the validity of this statement, suggesting that taken 
literally, a Non-Muslim who becomes a Muslim would also need to be killed. Id. at 52-53. However, this 
passage is widely cited as justifying death sentences for apostasy.  
37
 Garces, supra note 35. 
38
 Donna E. Arzt, The Role of Compulsion in Islamic Conversion: Jihad, Dhimma and Ridda, 8 BUFF. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 15, 30 (2002). 
39
 YUNUSA BAMBALE, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS UNDER ISLAMIC LAW 74, 80 (2d ed. 2003). 
40
 Garces, supra note 35, at 238. 
41
 MASHOOD A. BADERIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC LAW 124 (2003); EL-AWA, supra 
note 35, at 49-56; S.A. RAHMAN, PUNISHMENT OF APOSTASY IN ISLAM (1978).  
42
 Garces, supra note 35, at 238. 
43
 BADERIN, supra note 41, at 124.  
44
 BAMBALE, supra note 39, at 79. 
45
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 
1948), art. 18 (emphasis added) (hereinafter “UDHR”). 
46
 A United Nations Priority: Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/rights/HRToday/declar.htm. 
47
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 
368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1967) (ratified by Iran on June 24, 1975) (hereinafter “ICCPR”). 
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Article 18.1 which declares that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.
 
This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or 
belief of his choice, and freedom either individually or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, observance, practice and teaching.”48  
¶16  Because there were more Muslim states involved in the creation of the ICCPR than 
in the UDHR, the language of the rights guaranteed was watered-down to reflect a more 
Sharia-friendly version of human rights law.
 
Unlike the UDHR, the ICCPR does not 
expressly guarantee the freedom to “change” one’s belief.49 However, the Office of the 
High Commissioner in General Comment 22 interprets the language in Article 18.1 to 
“necessarily entail[] the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to 
replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as 
the right to retain one’s religious belief.”50  
¶17  Following Article 18.1, the next clause of the ICCPR expressly states that “[n]o one 
shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief of his choice.”51 Such a law should presumably bar forcing a former Muslim to 
return to Islam or face punishment. The General Comment gives some examples of 
violations including “policies or practices having the same intention or effect, such as, for 
example, those restricting access to education, medical care, employment or [other rights] 
. . . are similarly inconsistent with article.”52 The Comment also asserts that Article 18.2 
bars penal sanctions.53 Unless these exceptions are read extremely narrowly and without 
an inference that the threat of penal sanctions includes the threat of execution, the threat 
of execution would constitute a violation of Article 18.2. In any case, Iran’s incarceration 
of Pastor Youcef for apostasy is itself a violation of Article 18.2, regardless of the intent 
to execute him. 
¶18  However, Sharia law nations have largely ignored the General Comments and 
relied on their own narrow interpretation of the text of the ICCPR.54 While the UDHR 
granted all people the right to “change” their beliefs, the ICCPR uses the more 
ambiguous language “freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice.”55 
Most Muslim countries are of the opinion that it gives a non-Muslim the freedom to 
choose a non-Muslim religion or to embrace Islam, but these courts believe that in 
                                                 
48
 Id. at art. 18.1.  
49
 Id.  
50
 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No. 22: The right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (Sep. 30, 1993), 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/9a30112c27d1167cc12563ed004d8f15?Opendocument (on 
“the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which includes the freedom to hold beliefs”) 
(hereinafter “General Comment 22”). 
51
 ICCPR, supra note 47, at art. 18.2.  
52
 General Comment 22, supra note 50. 
53
 Id.  
54
 It is worth noting that the General Comments were created in 1993 while the ICCPR text was 
promulgated in 1966. Iran had signed the ICCPR before these comments were written.  
55
 See, e.g. Donna E. Arzt, The Application of International Human Rights in Islamic States, 12 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 214-18 (1990); Brice Dickson, The United Nations and Freedom of Religion, 44 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 
342 (1995).  
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accordance with Sharia, the ICCPR does not require the freedom to abandon the Muslim 
faith once someone has embraced Islam.56  
¶19  Although the ICCPR does have some express limitations on freedom of religion, 
those limitations are to be interpreted strictly. Article 18.3 allows states to restrict 
freedom to manifest one’s religion “to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedom of others.”57 General Comment 22 says Article 18.3 is to be “strictly interpreted” 
and that exceptions must be spelled out in law rather than applied in an arbitrary 
manner.58 As the Iranian example shows, apostasy crimes can become intertwined with 
crimes against public order and safety.59 However, General Comment 22, paragraph 8 
notes that national security concerns are not exempted from the Treaty.60 
¶20  The “moral” exception must also be construed strictly against allowing religious 
restriction.61 The Committee notes that moral restrictions must derive from several 
factors, including, social, philosophical, and religious traditions. Moreover, a moral 
exception must rely on more than one religious tradition.62  
¶21  Although the ICCPR and the UDHR speak in universal terms, just because human 
rights laws are written down by international bodies does not mean that nation states will 
recognize them. Sam Huntington has argued that Western culture and the Islamic culture 
have been clashing for the last 1300 years.63 He argued that the United Nations and 
international human rights laws are a Western construct, and that under his theory, 
Islamic nations would naturally resist international pressures. These cultural differences 
create policy differences and different interpretations of human rights.64 According to 
Huntington, pressing for Islamic countries to comply with Western norms, such as in the 
case of apostasy, would instead create an adverse reaction against Western norms.65 He 
refers to this reaction as a resistance to “human rights imperialism” and hastens a 
regression to indigenous values by the non-Western culture.66 
¶22  A response to the problem of cultural relativism is to address the conflict during 
times of transition, particularly when new Constitutions are drafted. Because of this 
cultural conflict between international norms and national norms, weaving international 
norms into the constitutions of emerging Islamic democracies might further the goals of 
human rights laws. The norms become provisions in the Constitutions, which then 
become the founding documents for the nations, a source of cultural identity, and a 
                                                 
56
 Berger, supra note 23, at 734 (“Egypt, upon ratification of the covenant in 1982, added the following 
statement: ‘Taking into consideration the provisions of the Islamic Sharia and the fact that they do not 
conflict with the text [i.e. the Covenant] . . . we accept, support and ratify it.’ This could be explained as an 
exception clause, but is more likely to be an assurance that the ICCPR is consistent with the Islamic 
Sharia.”). 
57
 ICCPR, supra note 47, at art. 18.3. 
58
 General Comment 22, supra note 50, at ¶ 8.  
59
 See FOX NEWS, supra note 6.  
60
 General Comment 22, supra note 50. 
61
 Id. at ¶ 8. 
62
 Id.  
63
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?,72 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 22, 31 (1993). 
64
 Id. at 29.  
65
 Id. at 40.  
66
 Id. at 41. 
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template for the nations’ aspirations.67 The Constitutions are generally obeyed because 
those in power have a stake in maintaining the rules for the Constitution. Undermining 
any particular rule undermines the greater Constitutional game and the government’s 
legitimacy to power.68 As the case studies show, infra, the nations with respect for 
international law tend to be those with superior records in human rights and freedom of 
religion.  
III.   THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMBIGUITIES   
A. How a Muslim to Christian Convert can be Imprisoned Despite a Constitution 
Guaranteeing Freedom of Belief 
¶23  At first glance, it would appear that the Iranian Constitution promotes religious 
freedom. Article 23 states “[t]he investigation of individuals’ beliefs is forbidden, and no 
one may be molested or taken to task simply for holding a certain belief.”69 Article 26 
also suggests that Iran gives the freedom to hold religious societies to non-Muslim 
groups.70 The Article concludes by saying no one can be prevented from participating in 
such groups. Article 13 recognizes Christians as a religious minority, and Article 14 
orders Muslims to “respect the human rights” of non-Muslims that are recognized 
religious minorities.71  
¶24  While a cursory read of the Iranian Constitution might suggest that the document is 
innocuous and grants religious freedom, the limiting provisos following the grants of 
freedom allow for a different interpretation. Following Article 13 of the Iranian 
Constitution, which recognizes the right of Christians to practice their religion inside 
Iran, the next Article in the Iranian Constitution states that the principle of protecting 
non-Muslims’ human rights applies only “to all who refrain from engaging in conspiracy 
or activity against Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran.”72 Because different 
                                                 
67
 See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitution Drafting In Post-Conflict States Symposium: What’s In A Name? 
Reflections On Timing, Naming, And Constitution-Making, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1249, 1296 (“Despite 
the inward focus of much discussion about constitutions, national constitutions also matter to a 
transnational community: they help define state sovereignty for purposes of recognition, they structure the 
state’s capacities to deal with other states, and they may affect the capacity of the states to comply with 
international norms of interest to all member nations, including those against offensive war and those 
protecting human rights.”). 
68
 Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1836 (citing RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY 82–140 (1999)). 
69
 ISLAHAT VA TAQYYRATI VA TATMIMAH QANUNI ASSASSI [Amendment to the Constitution], art. 23 
[1989] (Iran) (hereinafter “Iranian Constitution”). 
70
 Id. at art. 26 (“The formation of parties, societies, political or professional associations, as well as 
religious societies, whether Islamic or pertaining to one of the recognized religious minorities, is permitted 
provided they do not violate the principles of independence, freedom, national unity, the criteria of Islam, 
or the basis of the Islamic Republic.”). Likewise, Egyptian courts have held that apostasy deals not with 
freedom of belief to the individual, but the practice of belief, which is left to be regulated by the specific 
religious groups. See Berger, supra note 23, at 737.  
71
 Iranian Constitution, supra note 69, at art. 14. 
72
 Id. at art. 14; See also id. at art. 26 (providing freedom of association provided they do not “violate . . . 
the basis of the Islamic Republic”).  
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viewpoints disagree73 on whether apostasy, the act of leaving Islam as an adult as 
opposed to simply being born Christian, is a punishable activity against Islam,74 there is 
uncertainty as to the Iranian Constitution’s stance on apostasy. Unlike the UDHR and the 
General Comments to the ICCPR, the Iranian Constitution is silent on whether one can 
change religions.  
¶25  The Iranian Constitution is ambiguous as to protections for religious minorities. 
Because Article 13 and Article 1475 are in tension with each other, a radicalized Iranian 
regime is free to take aggressive steps against its citizens when they renounce Islam. In 
other nations of Islamic faith, populist democracy is likely to be a threat rather than a 
cure to the problem of apostasy because in many nations over eighty percent of the 
population favors the death penalty for those who leave Islam.76 This problem persists 
despite a theological debate over whether the Quran permits the death penalty or 
imprisonment for apostasy.77 The solution going forward for nations of Islamic faith is to 
provide more explicit protection for religious freedom within their Constitutions so 
legislatures and courts are constrained from exercising a radicalized interpretation of 
Islam. In addition, demanding respect for international law within the text of the 
Constitution would be helpful.  
¶26  Because the Iranian Constitution’s ambiguities are problematic, a comparison of 
other Muslim majority countries’ Constitutions with superior human rights records could 
be beneficial. Turkey, Lebanon, and Morocco, while not possessing perfect records on 
human rights, are examples of Muslim countries with a significant level of respect for the 
human rights community78 that emerging Arab Spring democracies could look to while 
drafting and amending their own Constitutions. This section will engage in a comparison 
of Iran’s Constitution to those of nations that have recently experienced unrest: Syria and 
Libya. The section will conclude with a discussion of how constitutional courts can 
undermine constitutional freedom of religion in order to show that vague, though 
seemingly innocuous, grants of religious freedom can be manipulated by the courts.  
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B. The Turkish Constitution: Muslim Majority and Partly Free 
¶27  The Turkish example is noteworthy, given its above average Freedom House 
ranking with regards to political and civil rights.79 Although Turkey has recently had 
political turmoil, its rankings have consistently been average or above average for the last 
decade.80 As a percentage of population, Turkey is actually more Muslim than Iran, with 
99.8 percent of the population in Turkey consisting of Muslims, 81 while Iran is only 98 
percent Muslim.82 The two nations are also nearly identical in terms of population.83 
However, their constitutions are different, as are their human rights records.  
¶28  The Turkish Constitution provides more protection to freedom of religious thought 
than does its Iranian counterpart. The Turkish Constitution says that “no one may be 
compelled to reveal his or her religion, conscience, thought or opinion, nor be accused on 
account of them.”84 This clause falls under Part II of the Turkish Constitution, which is 
titled “Fundamental Rights and Duties.”85 
¶29  However, like Iran’s Constitution, the Turkish Constitution does allow for the 
suspension of rights under certain circumstances. The Turkish Constitution allows for 
partial or entire suspension of fundamental rights in times of “war, mobilization, martial 
law, or state[s] of emergency.”86 Yet, that paragraph appears before the guarantee that no 
one may be compelled to reveal his religion. Under the construction that the general 
should not detract from the specific guarantee of protection, the Turkish Constitution 
would be more protective of religious freedom than the Iranian Constitution. The Turkish 
Constitution says when referring to those times of emergency “[e]ven under the 
circumstances indicated in the first paragraph . . . no one may be compelled to reveal his 
or her religion.”87 While the Iranian Constitution restricts its grants of freedoms, the 
Turkish Constitution actually restricts its restrictions of freedoms.  
¶30  Another difference is that the Turkish Constitution seems to protect specific people, 
while the Iranian Constitution protects mainly religious groups. The Iranian Constitution 
says in Article 13 that it protects Zorastrians, Jews, and Christians, but leaves out other 
minority faiths such as Bahais.88 That protection in the Iranian Constitution given to those 
three faiths can be viewed more as a protection of ethnic groups as opposed to religions 
because the enumerated protection would not apply to a Muslim who decides to leave his 
or her faith for another or when one decides to abandon his or her religion. Although Iran 
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does have a section of its Constitution devoted to the rights of the people, the provisions 
on religion fall outside that section.89 By contrast, the Turkish requirement that no one be 
compelled to reveal his religion is under the Fundamental Rights section.90 The rights fall 
under Chapter II of Part II, the Rights and Duties of the Individual.91 
¶31  Unlike Turkey, many of the Iranian grants of religious freedoms are written in 
limiting terms: “Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only recognized 
religious minorities.”92 Article 20 of the Iranian Constitution provides specific equality to 
people, as opposed to groups, but the language implies that the protections are 
subordinate to Islamic law.93 Contrast this with the Turkish Constitution, which states: 
“[e]veryone possesses inherent fundamental rights and freedoms which are inviolable and 
inalienable.”94 In the Turkish Constitution, there is no qualification that the freedom of 
religion must be “in conformity with Islamic law.” 
¶32  Turkey also goes further than Iran by providing remedies within the Constitution 
for violations of fundamental rights. Article 40 of the Turkish Constitution allows for the 
“right to request prompt access” to authorities when such rights have been violated, and 
also gives the injured person a right to receive damages for the injury, which will be paid 
for by the State.95 The Iranian Constitution provides no such right to sue for damages for 
infringements on these rights.  
¶33  Beyond respect for religious minorities, the Turkish Constitution contains more 
respect for international law than its Iranian counterpart. The Turkish Constitution says 
that even when fundamental rights must be suspended, they are limited by a proviso, 
which requires that “obligations under international law are not violated.”96 The Iranian 
Constitution does not possess a similar command that international treaties or law be 
respected. Rather, it demands that Islamic law be complied with in order to restrict rights, 
rather than expand them.97 This greater protection for international law in the Turkish 
Constitution contains the lesser protection for religious minorities.  
¶34  Although both countries are under equal obligation to obey international law, 
Turkey has a better record of doing so. The Turkish Constitution also contains more 
explicit respect for international law than the Iranian Constitution, suggesting why one 
country is more in accord with international norms than the other, even though both 
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countries have ratified the ICCPR.98 Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution states that, 
“[i]nternational agreements duly put into effect bear the force of law. No appeal to the 
Constitutional Court shall be made with regard to these agreements, on the grounds that 
they are unconstitutional.”99 Article 90 also adds emphasis to Article 15, which provides 
for the supremacy of international law when there is a tension between international 
human rights law and the need to suspend fundamental rights in a time of war or 
emergency.100 The Turkish Constitution maintains that, “[i]n the case of a conflict 
between international agreements in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms duly put 
into effect and the domestic laws due to differences in provisions on the same matter, the 
provisions of international agreements shall prevail.”101 The Iranian Constitution contains 
no such provision. 
C. Lebanon: A Muslim-Majority Country in Favor of the UDHR  
¶35  Respect for religious minorities and international law in the constitutions of 
Muslim majority nations is not limited to the Turkish Constitution. The Lebanese 
Constitution likewise respects religious freedom and the supremacy of international 
human rights law.102 According to the CIA Factbook, 59.7 percent of the Lebanese 
population is Muslim, although it does not consider itself an Islamic nation.103 Freedom 
House ranks Lebanon with an above average worldwide score in civil liberties, and 
Lebanon is the highest ranked Muslim-majority country in the Middle East.104 In 
Lebanon, only six percent of Muslims surveyed by Pew Research supported the Death 
Penalty as punishment for apostasy.105 
¶36  The Lebanese Constitution is different from its Iranian counterpart in that the 
Lebanese version is framed around the importance of human rights law. The Lebanese 
Constitution’s preamble establishes that it is a “founding and active member of the 
United Nations Organization and abides by its covenants and by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.”106 The next sentence requires that the government abide 
by these principles “without exception.”107  
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¶37  Both Lebanon and Iran have a titled article of their respective Constitutions 
guaranteeing equality before the law.108 The Lebanese Constitution, after guaranteeing 
that everyone will be equal, says that all Lebanese citizens “equally enjoy civil and 
political rights and equally are bound by public obligations and duties without any 
distinction.”109 Compare that provision with the counterpart in the Iranian Constitution: 
rather than emphasize that equality is guaranteed without distinction, equality is 
guaranteed only if it is “in conformity with Islamic criteria.”110 Once again, the Iranian 
Constitution provides limiting language where its counterpart Constitution, which is more 
liberal, inserts language that puts emphasis on the freedom given earlier in the provision.  
¶38  Article 9 of the Lebanese Constitution then guarantees “absolute” freedom of 
religion, with the “guarantees that the personal status and religious interests of the 
population, to whatever religious sect they belong, is respected.”111 While Article 23 of 
the Iranian Constitution does provide for freedom of religious belief, the Constitution 
contains several limiting statements whereby the regime limits rights to those who do not 
“engage in conspiracy or activity against Islam.”112 Moreover, as the Egyptian discussion 
will show, infra, Sharia courts have justified apostasy punishments despite guarantees of 
freedom of belief because the laws of Islam require obedience to the faith once someone 
decides to join that faith.113 Since Iran is an Islamic Republic, and the state and the 
religion are intertwined, to betray one’s religion in Islam would be similar to treason or 
“engag[ing] in conspiracy” against Islam.114  
¶39  Meanwhile, Lebanon, like Turkey, is not an Islamic republic, and even provided in 
its first Parliament that there would be equal representation between Muslims and 
Christians and therefore does not have this entanglement of the religion and the state that 
allows for religious abandonment to be conflated with a threat to the state’s authority.115  
D. Morocco: A Sharia Law Constitution 
¶40  Although the Lebanese and Turkish examples exhibit higher-rated levels of civil 
rights success than that of Morocco, the Moroccan example might have more in common 
with Iran because Morocco has declared Islam the state religion.116 Morocco scores a 
middle ranking of 4 out of 7 under the Freedom House civil liberties category, and is the 
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highest-rated officially Muslim nation in the Middle East region.117 While the nation does 
have sectarian problems with respect to religion, and has had power concentrated in the 
monarchy, it scores significantly higher than Iran in terms of civil liberties and is worth 
comparing constitutionally.  
¶41  Although the 1992 Moroccan Constitution declares the nation a “Muslim Sovereign 
State,” the Moroccan Constitution contains some key differences from its Iranian 
counterpart.118 Unlike the Iranian Constitution, which uses Islam to limit freedom of 
religion, the Moroccan Constitution asserts that Islam “guarantees to all freedom of 
worship.”119 Article 6 of the Moroccan Constitution guarantees an unqualified freedom of 
religion. Article 9 then guarantees the rights of citizens “freedom of opinion, freedom of 
expression under all its forms, and freedom to assemble,” and orders that no restrictions 
can be imposed on such freedoms other than by law.120 Article 44 indicates that “law” is 
that which is voted on by the Chamber of Representatives, rather than something imposed 
by an administrative agency.121 While the “by law” exemption does have some 
vagueness, it contrasts with the Iranian grants of liberties that are qualified by imposed 
Islamic criteria. The Moroccan equality article is different from its Iranian counterpart in 
that its grant is not qualified.122 The Moroccan equality article simply states that “[a]ll 
Moroccans are equal before law.”123 The Iranian counterpart contains the proviso that the 
equality must be “in conformity with Islamic criteria.”124 
¶42  The Moroccan Constitution is far from perfect. The Moroccan Constitution does 
have religious limitations for government officials,125 but no restrictions on freedom of 
religion for lay people. Article 37 suggests that members of the Chambers of 
Representative can be imprisoned for questioning the Muslim religion.126 However, that 
limitation applies only to the Chamber of Representatives under Title III of the Moroccan 
Constitution.  
¶43  The more acute difference between the Moroccan and the Iranian Constitutions is 
that the Moroccan version respects international law.127 The Moroccan Constitution, 
although endorsing Sharia, demonstrates that a Sharia law country is capable of 
endorsing international norms. In its third sentence, the preamble of the Moroccan 
Constitution declares that Morocco is an “active and energetic member” of international 
organizations and that it is “aware of the necessity of setting its actions” within the 
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context of such organizations.128 Further, the preamble “subscribes to the principles, 
rights, and obligations resulting from the charters of the aforesaid organizations and 
reaffirms its attachment to the Human Rights as they are universally recognized.”129  
¶44  While not a perfect document with respect to religious freedom, the Moroccan 
Constitution is distinguishable from the Iranian Constitution in its explicit respect for 
international human rights and its unqualified grant of religious freedoms.130 Despite 
being an Islamic country, the Moroccan Constitution asserts a respect for international 
human rights treaties like the more liberal non-Muslim, Muslim-majority nations of 
Turkey and Libya.  
E. Bad Constitutional Examples: Libya and Syria 
¶45  The Iranian Constitution more closely resembles that of countries that are 
experiencing unrest at the moment. Neither Syria, a country experiencing civil war, nor 
Libya, another country in transition, allows unqualified freedom of religion.131 
Furthermore, neither country’s Constitution expresses respect for international 
organizations or international norms.132  
¶46  The Syrian and Libyan Constitutions are like the Iranian Constitution in that each 
country expressly limits its grants of religious freedom in their respective constitutions. 
For example, the Syrian Constitution guarantees freedom to hold any religious rites 
“provided they do not disturb the public order.”133 The Libyan Constitution under 
Colonel Qaddafi gave religious freedom, but “in accordance with established 
customs.”134 However, the previous sentence notes that Islam is the religion of the 
state.135  
¶47  Syria and Libya are also like Iran in that neither Constitution asserts a respect for 
international human rights law. Not surprisingly, the word “international” does not even 
appear in the Libyan Constitution, making it similar to the Iranian Constitution in that 
neither gives explicit support to abiding by international treaties. Likewise, in the Syrian 
Constitution, the word “international” only appears in the context that the People’s 
Assembly must approve such treaties.136   
F. Sharia Courts 
¶48  Admittedly, there is more to constitutional interpretation than the text itself. Some 
constitutions give nominal protection to religion, but also give deference to courts to 
interpret Sharia law.137 
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¶49  There is a dispute over the breadth to which apostasy laws are intended to apply 
under Sharia law. Some argue that under the Quran, apostasy was only meant to apply to 
national security concerns such as treason or rebellion.138 When drafters create 
ambiguous constitutional language, legislatures, agencies, and courts are given more 
room to make assertions, such as the Iranian regime is now doing, that the apostate is a 
threat to national security and the Islamic state. Article 14 of the Iranian Constitution 
gives interpreters discretion if they can successfully argue that the person is a threat 
against the state.139 Likewise, in the Pastor Youcef case, the Iranian regime has declared 
Youcef a Zionist and a threat to national security.140  
¶50  The sanctioning of some Sharia courts also undermines private law and order with 
respect to apostasy. In Palestine, for instance, Sharia courts have frequently publicized an 
act of apostasy and named the guilty party a threat to the community.141 The courts 
further declare the apostate to be an outcast.142 The Sharia courts do not have legal effect, 
but instead rely on their tradition and popularity in carrying out their decrees.143 Although 
they do not order private killings, Sharia courts generally do not prosecute instances of 
private punishment for apostasy, meaning that those individuals outside the government 
who take issue with a person choosing to leave Islam are generally free to punish those 
persons.144 Given the public support for such acts of punishment, there are no negative 
legal consequences for such acts of vigilante justice.  
¶51  Simply because a constitution protects different religious groups does not mean a 
court will protect an individual from apostasy punishment. For example, in Egypt, the 
Constitution prior to the Arab Spring guaranteed freedom for “religious rites.”145 While it 
protected the rite or the group, its protection for the individual was not as broad. Like 
Iran, the courts have often read acts of apostasy as threats to the national security of the 
nation and a threat to the religion of Islam.146  
¶52  While the Egyptian Constitution did preserve the “freedom of belief,” the 
interpretation by the courts has been that the freedom of belief only applies to non-
Muslims.147 In 1980, the Egyptian Administrative Court reasoned that the “State’s 
religion is Islam . . . Since the plaintiff has embraced Islam, he must then submit to its 
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law which does not condone apostasy.”148 Likewise, Egypt’s highest court, the Court of 
Cassation,149 has said that a prohibition on apostasy does not violate “freedom of 
belief.”150 Rather, the Constitutional Court has interpreted “freedom of belief” as the right 
to practice one’s religion, rather than the right to change such a religion.151 
¶53  Egypt ratified the ICCPR and believes it is in compliance with the international 
law. When Egypt ratified the ICCPR, it did so only on the belief that it did not conflict 
with Sharia, so it still believes it can enforce apostasy laws under international law.152 
Therefore, the Egyptian constitutional courts have said that Sharia trumps freedom of 
belief.
 
153 However, the ICCPR makes no allowance for reservations on the norms of the 
treaty.154  
¶54  Although democracy is often seen as a protector of individual rights,155 the Arab 
Spring could actually threaten the rights of those who choose to leave the Muslim faith. 
The threat of punishment for apostasy could become more acute in Muslim countries 
experiencing unrest. As mentioned, supra, over three quarters of Muslims in Egypt and 
Pakistan favor the death penalty for those who leave Islam.156 Up until the Egyptian 
revolution of 2011, apostasy was in a status of “limbo” in Egypt.157 Although Egyptian 
statutory law is silent on apostasy, the Egyptian Court of Cassation has understood there 
to be a ban on apostasy.158 In 1980, the Egyptian Administrative Court also said that “[i]t 
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is completely acceptable for non-Muslims to embrace Islam but by consensus Muslims 
are not allowed to embrace another religion or to become of no religion at all.”159  
¶55  Courts have applied apostasy punishments in Egypt in the context of family law. 
Since there are co-existing legal structures for different religions in Egypt and no civil 
marriages, apostasy results in “civil death” when one leaves the Muslim faith.160 An act 
of apostasy renders marriage between a former Muslim and a Muslim null, requires 
separation, and severs all inheritance rights.161 Moreover, the apostate is forbidden from 
remarrying, and all blood ties with existing family members, including children, become 
null and void.  
¶56  Egyptian apostasy punishments often have a political motive.162 Egyptian law has 
routinely imposed punishment for apostasy in the past. The most public example 
occurred in 1996, when Egyptian Scholar Nasr Hamed Abu Zayd was implicated by his 
fellow scholars for his revisionist writings on the Quran.163 The court of Cassation ruled 
that his writings constituted apostasy, which led to a divorce from his wife, since a 
Muslim could not be married to a non-Muslim.164 The ruling forced Zayd to flee Egypt to 
avoid civil death.165  
¶57  Despite Zayd’s attempt to argue that he could not be an apostate because he still 
claimed to be a Muslim, the Court ruled that because he affirmed his belief in his 
writings, which were non-Muslim, he was an apostate: 
[h]e is an apostate, because he has revealed his unbelief after having been 
a believer, even if he claims to be a Muslim . . . An apostate cannot be 
excused when he claims to be a Muslim, because he has adopted a stance 
contrary to Islam. But then a heretic (al-zandiq) usually talks about his 
infidelity and proclaims his wrong faith while at the same time claiming 
that he is a Muslim.166  
¶58  Accusations and punishments of blasphemy have been leveled against revisionist 
scholars.167 However, this case was the first in Egypt where a scholar was branded an 
apostate for his writings. 
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IV.   THE NEW CONSTITUTIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF ARAB SPRING SHOULD EXPLICITLY 
RECOGNIZE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND GIVE UNQUALIFIED FREEDOM OF 
RELIGION  
¶59  The Arab world’s constitutions are currently under construction in the aftermath of 
2011’s Arab Spring. Tunisia, the first Arab Spring nation, is currently drafting a new 
Constitution.168 In Egypt, a newly elected parliament in 2012 drafted the new 
Constitution, which is now in doubt after the July 3, 2013 ouster of Mohamed Morsi.169 
Likewise, the new Libyan parliament was scheduled to draft a new Constitution 
following June 2012 elections.170 Given the volatility of the region, the next decade could 
see several additional constitutional amendments if more regimes fall.171  
¶60  Although the Arab Spring brought about great optimism in the world, the outcome 
of the Constitution of Egypt and ultimately its future as a democracy remains uncertain, 
as the version that passed under Morsi was ambiguous. The Egyptian military has 
scheduled revisions for the constitution in the coming months.172 On March 30, 2011, 
Egypt’s military leadership announced a provisional Constitution, which was set to 
remain in effect until after the 2012 Parliamentary elections.173 However, the language of 
the provisional Egyptian Constitution read similarly to that of the pre-revolution 1971 
Constitution. Article II declared Islam as the State religion. Article 6 declared there 
would be no religious inequality.174 Article 11 granted the “freedom of creed.”175 
¶61  When matched with other Muslim Constitutions, it would appear that the 
provisional Egyptian Constitution more closely resembled the Iranian Constitution than 
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those of Lebanon and Turkey in that the provisional Constitution declares Islam to be the 
state religion. Moreover, it declared Sharia the “principal source of legislation.”176 
Furthermore, there was nothing in the provisional Constitution recognizing international 
treaties or the supremacy of international human rights law.177 Like the 1971 
Constitution, the Egyptian Constitution affords protection to “religious rites” but does not 
protect the right for individuals to practice or change their beliefs.178 
¶62   However, the Constitution uses broader language in favor of religious freedom 
than Iran’s Constitution uses. Unlike the Iranian Constitution, the Egyptian Constitution 
does not have qualifying language that the grants of rights must be in accordance with 
“Islamic criteria.”179 The grant of equality in Article 6 of the provisional Egyptian 
Constitution is unqualified, and says that citizens may not be discriminated against based 
on religion.180 However, without a respect for international law and an unqualified grant 
of freedom of religion, the Egyptian Constitution could be more like those of Turkey and 
Lebanon.  
¶63  With prominent Islamists being released from prison under the provisional 
government, there exists a danger that the apostasy laws could become worse in a new 
constitutional regime.181 On October 9, 2011, Christian protests in Egypt resulted in a 
clash with police that left 24 dead.182  
¶64  On December 26, 2012, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi replaced the 
provisional Constitution when he signed the new Constitution into law, following the 
Constitution passing a referendum and being approved by the Constituent Assembly.183 
The Constitution would likely not protect against apostasy punishment. The Constitution 
forbids “[i]nsult or abuse of all religious messengers and prophets.”184 The Constitution 
declares that Islam is the state religion and that Sharia is the main source of legislation.185 
However, there is some encouraging language about the “respect for human rights and 
freedoms” and a ban on political parties from discrimination based on religion.186 The 
Constitution also allows freedom of belief, but “as regulated by law” and for “divine 
religions.”187 The Iranian example shows that those could imply limitation and a selective 
view on which religions are acceptable. The legality of apostasy is ambiguous as the right 
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to change one’s religion is not enumerated, nor is there an affirmation of international 
treaties and declarations such as the UDHR or the ICCPR.  
¶65  Likewise, Sharia law and the issue of religious freedom are being debated in the 
Tunisian constitutional convention. As CNS reports, the first draft under consideration 
used Sharia law.188 The draft, released in August 2012, was subsequently redone in 
December 2012. However, human rights concerns continue to abound.189 Moreover, it 
does not affirm a commitment to international treaties, the UN, or the ICCPR like the 
Turkish and Lebanese Constitutions. Rather, it says that “[r]espect for international 
conventions is compulsory if they do not contravene this constitution”—potentially 
subordinating the international conventions to domestic interpretations of the 
Constitution.190  
¶66  The Constitution of Libya remains uncertain, as the Libyan Transitional Counsel 
has been mired in sectarian conflict and its own allegations of human rights abuses.191 
While constitutional change can be effective, it is not easy. The drafting of the 
constitution has been mired in delays, although currently the Libyans will directly elect a 
committee to draft its new constitution.192 
¶67  On November 24, 2011, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh resigned after nine 
months of protests. However, the Parliament remained.193 On March 18, Yemeni political 
factions met to begin drafting a new constitution.194 
V.   CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
¶68  If the Middle East continues to transform with more young people demanding 
freedom, economic upward mobility, and equality, changes to their constitutions will be 
demanded. These emerging democracies should keep in mind that unqualified grants of 
religious freedoms as well as specifically enumerated human rights consistent with 
international law could be beneficial in framing their new national identities.  
¶69  Changing the text of a constitution will not immediately change a culture, but it can 
guide it in future generations as legislatures and courts look to their founding documents 
in interpreting the laws. While a future radicalized regime could try to ignore the 
constitution, granting human rights in accordance with international law makes those 
rights more difficult to take away since the population then becomes used to exercising 
them. Disobeying the constitution and laws would likely result in stronger outrage and 
reprimand from the public, relevant interest groups, and political opponents. 
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¶70  While there is more to a nation than the text of its constitution, as its founding 
document, it can specify its norms and values for coming generations. Although apostasy 
is a difficult issue in the Arab world, these emerging democracies will want to maintain 
their good standing in the international community while also retaining their identities as 
Muslim nations. These coming years could slowly undo the tension between those two 
goals. If a nation wants human rights and the freedom of religion to be promoted, now is 
the time to codify those aspirations. 
 
 
